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Theodore Beza—
The Man Next to John Calvin:
A Review Essay

by Keith C. Sewell

Scott M. Manetsch, Theodore Beza and the Quest for
Peace in France, 1572-1598. (Studies in Medieval and
Reformation Thought # 79), Leiden: Brill, 2000, ISBN:
90 04 11101 8, xii + 380 pp. Also, Jeffrey Mallinson,
Faith, Reason, and Revelation in Theodore Beza, 15191605. (Oxford Theological Monographs), London:
Oxford University Press, 2003, ISBN: 0 19 925959 3,
267 pp. Both works include a bibliography.
Dr. Keith C. Sewell is Professor of History and Chair
of the History Department at Dordt College.

Beside the great man, perhaps to his right, or
one pace behind, and probably somewhat in his
shadow, there is often to be found a significant
co-worker and successor. From the Bible we
know of Elijah and Elisha, and Paul and
Barnabas. In sharp contrast, modern European

history requires that we confront Hindenberg and
Ludendorf as well as Lenin and Trotsky. More
positively, in the history of the Reformation we
encounter Luther and Melanchthon in Wittenberg, Zwingli and Bullinger in Zürich, and Calvin
and Beza in Geneva. Of course, the second man
in each duo is never a true Doppelgänger. He has
his own place, task, and calling; his own struggles
and aspirations; yet his historical reputation has
often been overshadowed by the more prominent
figure. Manetsch’s and Mallinson’s books pay
welcome attention to one such man: Theodore
Beza (1519-1605). Without denying Calvin’s
immense importance, one finds it hard not to conclude that Beza has been seriously neglected
when one considers the vast literature on Calvin.
Born in 1519 at Vézelay, France, Theodore
Dieudonne Beza outlived the first and second
generation of reformers. He embraced the
Reformation, was obliged to flee his homeland,
and first arrived in Geneva in 1548. After a difficult period in Lausanne from 1549 to 1558, he
returned to Geneva to become the rector of the
newly established Academy. He was soon regarded as Calvin’s right-hand man and designated
successor. Upon Calvin’s death in 1564, Beza
took up the mantle of leadership. Scott
Manetsch’s work focuses on the role played by
Beza in the search for peace between Catholics
and Huguenots (Calvinists) in France in the period 1572-1598.
In many ways, the 1560s stand as a pivotal
decade in the history of Calvinism. The decade
witnessed crucial developments in Scotland,
France, and the Netherlands. In France, in the
months leading up to the Colloquy of Poissy in
1562, it was possible to believe that the kingdom
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was on the brink of Protestantism (338). Yet
Protestantism was not to be. The subsequent
Edict of St. Germain (January 1562) represents
the high point of Huguenot power. From the massacre of Huguenots at Vassy (March 1562)
onward, France descended into a period of fearful
disorder lasting until 1598. Within this period,
historians distinguish no less than eight civil
wars, excluding the Spanish military intervention
of 1596-97. The issue between Catholics and
Huguenots was always at stake—but often not the
sole point of contention, as dynastic considerations were also in play. In retrospect, it is hard not
to see the appalling atrocities of the Saint
Bartholomew’s Day massacres of August 24,
1572, as breaking the back of the Huguenot
movement. Too many actual and potential leaders
were lost in this fearful episode (31-5).
Thereafter, while Beza continued to call for the
reformation of the church, a new note is definitely sounded. Concern for exposed and persecuted
Huguenots—and never let it be forgotten that
they were compatriots—drove Beza to entertain
and advance views that Calvin had opposed (5).
Faced with extermination, Calvinists now produced a literature that justified and articulated
resistance (55). This resistance created the context for some very important reformed contributions to the literature of political theory, particularly François Hotman’s Francogallica (1573),
Beza’s own Du droit des magistrats (1574), and
Vindiciae contra tyrannos (1579), now generally
attributed to Philippe Duplessis-Mornay (64f.,
111). Manetsch’s study of Beza in these years of
harrowing stress and strain is a very fine achievement. With great skill and scholarship, he takes us
into the life of a man who at one point might have
thought that he was on the brink of leading France
to a national Calvinistic reformation but who had
instead to taste the bitter waters of disappointment, betrayal, and uncertainty. The supreme
tragedy of 1572 was not effaced by the false dawn
of 1575-6, following the Edict of Beaulieu (90-2).
Thereafter, it seems as if all was decline—and a
sense of this decline only heightened the ensuing
search for peace and security (113). In the decade
that followed, there were trials on all sides: the
mounting Jesuit challenge (123); the stridency of
the “Gnesio-Lutherans,” who in the complexities
of German affairs were ready to side with
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Catholics against the Reformed (134); and the
revival of the Catholic League within France
itself (145). Beza experienced growing isolation
under these conditions and took to writing the
history of Reformed Christianity for a reformed
posterity—if there was to be one (138-9).
Certainly those who persevered did so in order
to maintain their confessional integrity. There
were other prospects also. There was Henry of
Navarre, the Bourbon heir to the throne of France
during the reign of Henry III (1574-1589). Henry
of Navarre professed the Huguenot creed. Yet
there were always doubts concerning this man
(176), who could seem overly politique (103).
Beza, too, who seems to have been skeptical initially (92), eventually came to trust and support
him (174-6). It is especially in aspects of the relationship between Beza and Henry of Navarre
(93f.) and in the complexity of the 1589-93 period (194f.) that Manetsch breaks new ground, in
the latter case supplementing the well-thumbed
pages of Nicola Mary Sutherland’s The Huguenot
Struggle for Recognition (1980).
When Henry of Navarre signed the Treaty of
Trève with (Catholic) Henry III in 1589 (both
men standing in opposition to Henry of Guise and
the Catholic League), Beza was delighted (190).
When an assassin felled Henry III, and Henry of
Navarre acceded to the throne, Beza was beside
himself in hopeful expectation. A Protestant
monarch at last! Might not the tribulations of the
previous decade yet prove to be the prelude to a
glorious future? Nevertheless, doubts persisted as
to Henry of Navarre’s confessional sincerity.
Beza preferred to see Henry of Navarre as another David: a man with defects but nevertheless the
Lord’s anointed (210).
These remained dangerous times. In the early
1590s both Paris and Geneva were under siege.
Paris, now controlled by the Catholic “Holy
League,” was besieged by Henry of Navarre, and
Protestant Geneva by the forces of Catholic
Savoy (194), so that the Catholic counter-reformation now reached almost to the city gates
(321). And while Geneva suffered, Zürich prospered (217). The passing of many friends pained
a weary Beza (309). Eventually, his circumstances were so reduced that he was obliged to
sell his library (215). Having already endured the
apostasy of many (40f., 162f.), Beza lived to see

Henry of Navarre’s renunciation of his Huguenot
commitment and conversion to Catholicism in
July 1593. This provoked even more desertions
from the Reformed ranks (272 f.). This betrayal
was a “terrible shock” (257) to Beza, already
deeply concerned at proposals for CatholicHuguenot comprehension that would result in
immediate compromise and eventual surrender,
such as the project floated by Jean Hotman (224).
Manetsch suggests that Beza seriously misunderstood Henry of Navarre’s (now Henry IV’s)
estimation of their relationship (257). Perhaps
Manetsch has yet to come to a fully satisfactory
resolution of this question. We may not doubt the
poignancy of Beza’s final meeting with Henry IV
(337), but granted that Beza was not politically
naïve, how may we adequately account for the
manner in which Henry IV regained and retained
Beza’s trust (263)? Or was that trust in some
sense both pro forma and pragmatic—a stance
adopted for want of any practical alternative?
Other hard questions remain. Did Beza preserve Calvin’s true doctrine? There is not too
much room to doubt that such was his intention,
but did he unintentionally distort that doctrine in
the manner in which he chose to articulate and
present Calvin’s teaching? Manetsch concurs
with those who say that while Beza “modified
and clarified aspects of Calvin’s thought through
the use of Aristotelian categories and logic,” he
“did not alter the religious and biblical center of
his mentor’s theology” (2).
The big question here has to do with whether or
not the use of such Aristotelian scholastic categories (however educationally motivated) is compatible with the actual starting point of the
Calvinistic reformation. Such questions are much
closer to the focus of Jeffrey Mallinson’s Faith,
Reason, and Revelation in Theodore Beza.
Mallinson does not ignore Beza’s context. He
confronts us with a Beza struggling on all fronts.
Beza’s contribution to reformed historiography
was not born out of wild optimism but out of
beleaguered and perplexing circumstances (19599). Amid many trials, he advocated a broad and
generous view of the Protestant principle of sola
scriptura (143-206).
Mallinson provides us with an extended discussion of the scope and cast of Beza’s doctrinal
writings. In a succession of carefully formulated

chapters, he considers such topics as revelation,
reason, nature, and faith. All of these inevitably
raise the question of the author’s outlook on such
issues. He distinguishes between three contemporary schools: (1) Barth and Neo-Orthodoxy; (2)
“Presuppositionalism,” which he associates with
Kuyper as well as Cornelius Van Til; and (3) the
“Reformed Epistemology” of Alvin Plantinga and
Nicholas Wolterstorff (6-7). For Mallinson, writers of the neo-orthodox school have proved themselves un-historical in their polemical use of the
sources (8-9). By contrast, the “presuppositionalists” and “reformed epistemologists” have erred
more by what they have been disposed to omit (910). Basically, at least, I think that he is right on
all three accounts. We are not entitled to sweep
aside the scholastic tendencies in Calvin himself.
Mallinson is rightly wary of anachronism (207).
Mallinson says that he wishes “simply to contribute to a reappraisal of the history of religious
epistemology in the Reformed tradition” (10).
Nevertheless, Mallinson is very much of the
school of Richard A. Muller when it comes to
interpreting both Calvin and his reformed successors (14 f., 113, 209 f.). Muller has virtually come
to dominate the field, with works such as Christ
and the Decree (1986), Post-Reformation
Reformed Dogmatics, 4 volumes (1987-2003),
The Unaccommodated Calvin (2000), and After
Calvin (2003). Muller’s prime thesis has been
that the earlier historiography, such as John S.
Bray’s
Theodore
Beza’s
Doctrine
of
Predestination (1975), both overstated and misrepresented the differences between Calvin and
his scholastic successors. Following Muller,
Mallinson insists that the “differences between
Calvin and the Calvinists are often exaggerated,”
there being “little in the orthodox Reformed writers that was not already licit or implicit in Calvin”
(14-15).
That there was a development from Calvin to
later reformed writers is hardly disputable. It is
the character, import, and significance of the
development that is at issue. And when reflecting
on the historical process, one is foolish to infer
intentions from outcomes. Certainly Beza did not
intend to betray the Calvinian legacy, but did the
way in which he articulated that legacy have that
effect, at least to some degree? Arguably, he conceded more than he actually intended. Living at a
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time when it had become apparent that both
Catholic and Protestant had failed to convince
each other, Beza confronted the accompanying
rising tide of skepticism (81-98). This skepticism
helps to explain his turn towards objectivism and
his tendency to emphasize the “rationality of
belief,” even as he sought to insert various safeguards in respect of “natural revelation” (101).
Within such a context, we find Beza defending
Aristotle in correspondence with Peter Ramus
(58), utilizing a general scholasticism when he
thought it elucidated right doctrine and opposing
scholasticism when it was seen to obscure the
truth (63-9).
Mallinson’s reflections bring him to the following conclusions:
… (1) the progression from rhetoric to
academic formalization encouraged a
concern for the objective aspect of religious belief; (2) in Beza’s attempt to
defend the teaching of his predecessor,
he often found subjective approaches to
the knowledge of God ineffectual in
politics and academic disputatio; (3) his
appreciation for academic disciplines in
general encouraged the incorporation of
epistemic considerations in the treatment of theology; (4) through his belief
in the pedagogical value of dialectic,
Beza sought to incorporate a logical
approach to the formalization of dogma
without resorting to rationalism; (5)
affirming the theological use of reason
within its own boundaries…Beza
affirmed the occasional value of providing evidential arguments for Christian
belief. (80)
Beza accepted philosophy but repudiated pagan
philosophy. However, he seems to have found the
means of acquiring features of the latter by adopting his own version of the great tradition. (12432).
Where Mallinson’s reflections suggest the
influences of Muller, we need to be very alert.
Muller’s prodigious researches are based on a
requirement not merely that we distinguish
between doctrinal content and a [scholastic]
mode of presentation but that we separate the
two. The scholastic method of doctrinal formulation, with its use of Aristotelian categories and
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distinctions, is seen as being in some sense a neutral vehicle of expression. The method is said not
to distort the doctrine that the method is used to
articulate. Clearly, some problems attach to this
viewpoint.
We should grant that many of the reformers –
even of the first generation – were steeped in the
scholastic method. And here we are wise to see
the via antiqua and via moderna as interacting
strands within a single broad tradition. But having
made this point, we should not use it as a basis for
foreclosing discussion about the relationship—
and I would venture to say, antithetical relationship—between scholasticism and the best
insights of the Protestant reformers. Like the rest
of us, the reformers were not paragons of complete consistency. When we are confronted with
the reformers’ scholastic manner, we should not
fixate on that to the extent that we ignore the
deeper tendency of their thought that led away
from scholasticism. This, it may be argued, is
what Muller and his followers are somewhat
inclined to neglect.
Irrespective of whether or not this neglect is the
intention, the work of the Muller school can have
the effect of legitimizing (or possibly we should
say re-legitimizing) Protestant, and especially
reformed, scholasticism. Mallinson’s willingness
to follow Muller draws him into Muller’s implied
re-legitimation of the very scholasticism that is
under investigation. Moreover, the work of the
Muller school may have the same effect as
scholasticism itself. It can give us a picture that
seems to be cut and dried. Everything is neatly
accounted for within the conceptual framework.
As a result, when the Muller school has done its
work, it can have the effect of curtailing our
researches and inhibiting further reflection. By
following Muller, Mallinson’s approach tends to
be congruent with that of the “Reformed
Epistemology” standpoint, which has its own
manner of drawing upon the “great tradition,”
although the latter often seems to presume forms
of Platonic realism, rather than call us to be the
disciples of Jesus Christ.
Of course, Muller and his followers are certainly not wholly wrong. The best work has been
based on massive researches into difficult texts.
Certainly, to depict the first reformers as
untouched or unshaped by the centuries of

scholastic philosophy that preceded them is to
indulge in an a-historical fantasy. But we should
not fall into the trap of thinking that the
Reformation, even as we recognize its continuities with late medieval thought, was next to nothing—a mere ecclesiastical hiccup. The truth is not
only that the thought of the Reformation is
incomprehensible apart from late medieval
scholasticism but also that both Luther and
Calvin at their best exceeded the limitations of
their immediate circumstances and historical context. Central to their viewpoint was not only their
understanding of the sovereignty of God but also
their understanding of the God who is Sovereign.
The case can be made for saying that at crucial
points both Luther and Calvin broke from the
Platonic view of the divine in their understanding
of God’s person and relationship with his creation, including his revelation of himself to us.
(Cf. Mallinson, 112, 155). At their best, Luther
and especially Calvin point us away from
Augustine and Aquinas towards much earlier
understandings.
Nevertheless, the present historiographical tendency is to under appreciate the radicality of both
Luther and Calvin in relation to their immediate
successors and would-be followers. The truth is
that unlike subsequent reformed scholastics,
Calvin bowed before certain boundaries. He honored the Creator/creatures distinction. He
acknowledged our limitations as creatures. As
Heiko Oberman has observed, Calvin “was careful to stay in the vestibule outside of God’s council chamber” (See Oberman, The Two
Reformations [2003], esp. at 139-142, cf. 32-43).
In scholasticism, reason sought to enter that
chamber. The truth is that scholasticism resulted
in a certain formalistic aridity that evoked its own
reaction. By the later seventeenth century, it was
driving believers into pietism, which in turn prepared the ground for the evangelical revivalism of
the eighteenth century, with its strongly anti-intellectual tendencies. A Protestant rationalism eventually provoked a pietistic anti-intellectual reaction, the consequences of which remain with us
today.
The two volumes here reviewed have their limitations. Manetsch does not purport to offer us a
full biography. It is to be hoped that he is contemplating one. Mallinson does not cross-compare

Calvin and Beza as thoroughly as we might wish.
He does not seem sufficiently aware of the criticisms of scholasticism lodged by Vollenhoven
and Dooyeweerd, as also articulated by writers
such as Roy A. Clouser in The Myth of Religious
Neutrality (1991). Mallinson’s representation of
“Amsterdam Neo-Calvinists” as “hostile to secular knowledge” (238) betrays more than one
serious misunderstanding of the Kuyperian standpoint, and arguably weakens the impact of his
conclusions. This mis-characterization confirms
that Mallinson has not broken out of the circle of
the kind of thinking that he describes. His affinity to Muller has not helped him here. If by
“secular” Mallinson means religiously neutral
non-theological knowledge, then certainly
Vollenhoven, Dooyeweerd, and Clouser deny the
possibility—not of non-theological knowledge
but of its religious neutrality. The scholastic mode
of discourse was not neutral, as Mallinson’s
provocative concluding remarks concerning
“emerging Enlightenment thinking” serve to confirm (236). If Beza carries us in that direction, he
does so because at a foundational level he does
depart significantly from the standpoint of Calvin
(cf. Clouser, Myth, 89-90, 185-87). Nevertheless,
both volumes are stimulating and informative,
and constitute valuable and welcome additions to
the literature on Beza in English. Both should
find a place in the libraries of serious students of
the Reformation.
The year 2005 marks the four hundredth
anniversary of the death of Beza. The April 2005
“Calvin Studies Society Colloquium,” to be held
at the Meeter Center, Calvin College, Grand
Rapids, Michigan, is to be on “Calvin and Beza.”
In the fall of 2005 an “International Symposium
on Theodore Beza” is to be held in Geneva,
Switzerland. We have good reason to expect that
Beza will not be neglected in the future as he has
been in the past. These volumes make important
contributions to this welcome development. We
cannot understand what Calvinism became without an appreciation of Theodore Beza.
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